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Rinderpest, a highly contagious cattle disease which swept 
through Southern Africa in 1896-97, has attracted very little interest 
from historians. A more detailed consideration of it illuminates the 
social, political and economic forces operating in the area during the 
1890s. 
Rinderpest first made its appearance in Africa in 1889. It 
has been described as "a specific malignant and highly contagious fever 
characterised by acute inflammation of the mucous surfaces", affecting 
cattle, game, and, in a minor form, sheep. (1) From Somaliland, where 
it first took root, it moved rapidly south, infecting game and cattle. 
By 1890, it was in Uganda. (2) In the latter half of 1892, Lugard 
encountered it in Northern Rhodesia: 
"1 had no evidence that the disease had 
attacked the wild game until I arrived 
at the south end of Lake Mweru. Here 
enormous quantities died. At the time 
of my passing in October 1892, the plague 
was at its height, dead or dying beasts 
were all around. ( 3 )  
The Zambezi was possibly the most effective barrier which rinderpest 
encountered in its travels southwards, for it was not until 1896 that 
the disease made its appearance in Southern Rhodesia. (4) By then, it 
was in a regionwilharelatively well developed communications network, 
where transport centred on the extensive use of the ox-wagon. The 
disease now moved with a speed which more than compensated for its 
protracted stay in Northern Rhodesia. It spread into the Bechuanaland 
territories and was at Palapye by the 10th March 1896; a mere six days 
later it was at Tuli. As the Cape Colonial Veterinary Surgeon, 
Hutcheon, reported later: 
"Within a period of 25 days [of the first reported 
occurrence in ~hodesia] therefore, rinderpes t had 
travelled southwards at a rate of 20 miles a day, 
and had reached a point 16 miles north of the 
Colonial border on the 31st March." (5) 
Despite the campaign waged against the disease in Southern Africa, 
rinderpest moved relentlessly southwards and by November of 1897 it was 
killing game on the Rhodes estate at Groot Schuur. (6) 
Despite a warning issued as early as 1892, the Cape Government 
had taken few, if any, precautions against the spread of rinderpest. (7) 
But as the disease spread through the recently annexed Bechuanaland 
territory, the extent of the devastation of cattle herds must have 
quickly become apparent. (8) As it spread, rinderpest left a flurry of 
belated activity in its wake. Local and national Rinderpest 
Commissions were established to co-ordinate attempts to prevent the 
diseasels spread. (9) Having scant respect for territorial integrity, 
rinderpest necessitated a series of inter-state conferences and even an 
"internati~nal~~ one. (10) With fencing at a cost of per mile, and 
compensation to be paid to the owners of infected cattle that had to be 
shot, it eventually cost the Cape Government alone over a million pounds. 
Yet, despite the plethora of administrative actions, co-operation and 
lack of co-operation, the "politics of rinderpestfl are to be found in 
places other than conference minutes. (11) 
Some of the indirect political repercussions of the spread of 
rinderpest have long been known to historians of Southern Africa. 
Rinderpest certainly formed part of the political backdrop to the 1896- 
97 revolt in Southern Rhodesia, and has been pointed to as such. (12) 
More recently, Saker ayld Aldridge have drawn attention to the background 
of rinderpest activity in the Langeberg Rebellion, and the elements of 
ffQnastic politicsIf involved. (13) Rinderpest, however, a.lso created a 
series of opportunities for political entrepreneurs to mobilise Africans 
elsewhere in Southern Africa. By focussing on some of these activities, 
some of the processes and problems in Southern African society during 
the last decade of the 19th century are highlighted. 
Basutoland and the adjacent territory of East Griqualand form 
one region which deserves closer examination. Basutoland, like other 
areas in Southern Africa, had been affected by the political tension 
which accompanied the Jameson Raid. (14) To the rumours which 
accompanied this event were added those connected with rinderpest. 
Africans in Basutoland were no exception in believing that rinderpest 
was the product of the white manls activities. (15) 
It fell to Godfrey Lagden, later the Transvaal's first 
Secretary of Native Affairs under British rule, to organise measures 
which would keep rinderpest out of Basutoland. For five months, 
preliminary measures, such as restrictions on cattle movement, 
succeeded in keeping rinderpest out of the territory. These 
precautionary measures gave rise to a series of rumours which 
disturbed Basutos considerably. One report told of the government 
importing loads of munition,md a second of the conscription of men 
in Matatiele for the purpose of attacking Basutoland. The latter 
rumour probably emerged from the recruitment of border-guards for 
rinderpest control. A third belief was that Basutoland was shortly 
to be opene,d for gold-prospecting - a prospect which would have aroused 
little enthusiasm. But amidst these rumours it was the actual erection 
of fencing on the border between Basutoland and the Cape which most 
aroused Basuto hostility and suspicion. Basutos were aware of the fact 
that, prior to the annexation of Pondoland, whites had fenced off the 
area. (16) With this precedent in mind they were understandably 
disturbed by the fencing activities on their border. (17) 
One such disturbed Mosuto was Makhaola, a junior son of the 
Paramount Chief, Lerothodi. In December of 1896, Makhaola, supported 
by a large band of young, armed Basutos, took up a position on the East 
Griqualand border, where fencing operations were under way. From this 
position they proceeded to intimidate and eventully completely obstruct 
the work of the Cape Government. (18) This action naturally produced 
official concern in both Basutoland and Matatiele. When the Assistant 
Commissioner at @chars Nek, however, attempted to sort out the matter 
by contacting the Resident Magistrate at Matatiele, he was forcibly 
detained by Makhaola and his men. (19) In the Cape, too, colonial 
officials had been threatened by amed men while carrying out rinderpest 
duties. (20) What was disturbing to the official mind in this case, 
however, was the fact that the threats came from armed Africans. 
Staulford, Chief Magistrate in East Griqualand, felt the situation to be 
very grave, and ordered the Cape border guards to disarm and behave in 
a "quiet and responsible" manner. Lagden, after getting two deputies 
from the Paramount Chief, proceeded by forced marches to Qachals Nek. 
It is not clear exactly what transpired at Qachafs Nek. 
Presumably Lagden, with the aid of the Paramountls deputies, persuaded 
Makhaola and his followers to leave the border. The position was still 
serious enough to warrant the holding of a national pitso presided over 
by Lerothodi. During the proceedings it became evident that Lerothodi 
was unwilling to make an outright condemnation of his young sonls 
activities. Pakhaola and his own sons interpreted this as important, 
albeit passive, support for his actions, and left both Lagden and the 
pitso with a flourish (21): 
"Pursuing a defiant course they then took up a 
warlike position near Mafeteng, with a band of 
turbulent followers, threatening violence to 
a q y  messengers who approached them and resistance 
to all overtures. The danger of the situation 
was aggravated by further threats against European 
life and property at the village magistracies of 
Mafeteng and Mohale's Hoek." (22) 
From this position Makhaola now attempted to elicit further 
support for the embryonic revolt, aiming at a complete overthrow of 
British rule. (23) It seems, however, that while he could gain the 
support of younger followers, he was unable to persuade the older chiefs 
of the wisdorn of his objective. It is clear that Makihaola used the 
political tensions which accompanied rinderpest in an attempt to 
mobilize Basutos for a more ambitious political objective. It was 
rinderpest which provided the opportunity and Lagden was aware of this 
when he later reported on the incidents: 
"In all native tribes there are those who 
chafe under any kind of control and readily 
seize an opportunity to run riot, shake off 
the fetters, and influence the masses by 
some cause or prophetic alarm." (24) 
Political tension, like rinderpest, showed little respect for 
colonial borders, and East Griqualand did not remain unaffected by 
either. As in the case of Makhaola in Basutoland, rinderpest provided 
a local inhabitant with the opportunity to mobilize Africans and 
Griquas for a larger political objective. In this case the leader was 
a Griqua, Andries le Fleur, who was descended from, and married to, 
Griqua notables. His father, Abraham le Fleur, claimed in 1884 to 
understand the legal complexities which troubled the dispossessed Griqua 
community. He created an air of expectancy amongst Griquas by claiming 
that they were to be paid compensation for land by the British 
Government. (25) He persisted with these "agitations" until blackmailed 
into silence by a missionary. (26) On his death, his son Andries 
renewed these "agitations" and gained a considerable following 
campaigning with the interesting but cumbersome slogan: "East 
Griqualand for the Griquas and the natives". (27) 
Le Fleur utilized the political tension of the early weeks of 
1897 by attempting to gain the support of Hlangweni, and possibly Eaca 
tribesmen, for an armed revolt. The types of rumours that circulated 
in Basutolavld were no doubt present here too, and contributed to the 
tension, until "The whole air was charged with electricity and it seemed 
as if the least spark would produce a conflagration". (28) The 
possibility of an armed uprising came to the notice of the isolated 
Etmopean community, who became most alarmed: "the unusual spectacle was 
witnessed of farmers hastily going into laager and taking other measures 
for mutual protection. (29) 
This preventative action, coupled with a full-scale patrol by 
the East Griqualand Mounted Rifles, seems to have stifled the progress 
of an African initiative. For a few days the whites were in laager, 
but by the 27th January the possibility of a revolt seemed more remote, 
and an investigation into the conduct of Chiefs Pata (Hlangweni) and 
Singapansi (~aca) was instituted. (30) That most of the anticipated 
action was prevented is evident from the report of the Eastern Province 
Herald correspondent, who wrote: 
"A widespread hostile agitation was undoubtedly 
got up by the Griqua agitator, Lefleur, but has, 
I think, been nipped in the bud by the prompt 
action of the Chief Magistrate and the patrol 
of the East Griqualand Mounted Rifles ." (31) 
Of Le Flew there was no trace, and the enquiry showed that 
the Hlangweni and not the Baca were implicated, Chief Pata of the former 




From about the middle of 1897 rinderpest started to take its 
toll of cattle throughout the area. Amidst widespread African belief 
that the disease was introduced by Europeans Le Fleur must have found 
an increasingly fertile field in which to propagate his ideas. 
Travelling throughout the area, he told Africans that land apportionment 
was "inequitable and iniquitous" and that the Europeans had gained 
possession of the land "by ways which would not bear the light of day". 
This, he apparently claimed, had come to the notice of the Queen, who 
had personally commanded that the lands be returned to the natives. As 
the Europeans refused to do this, he, Le Fleur, would visit the Queen 
to explain the situation. To this end he solicited funds with 
considerable success from the local population. 
In November of 1897, however, Le Fleur was finally tracked 
down and arrested by detectives from the newly established Criminal 
Investigation Department. In the trial which followed, however, there 
was insufficient evidence for his successful prosecution, (33) 
Le Fleurls release may have contributed to his growing prestige; 
certainly he used it for his own ends, in claiming that the judge, 
on releasing him, had complimented him on his "patriotism". 
While discontent over land issues simmered, and suspicions 
generated by rinderpest grew, Le Fleur, with his increased personal 
prestige, established himself at an African farm, "Drie Kop", where he 
planned an armed revolt. The comings and goings at the farm, however, 
aroused the suspicions of a neighbouring white farmer, who decided to 
get European assistance, and to investigate matters at "Drie Kopfl 
personally. One of his African servants became aware of this and 
informed Le Fleur immediately. Le Fleur and his men were forced to 
take action before they had completed detailed planning or preparations. 
Prematurely, therefore, "A strong party, consisting partly of Griquas 
and partly of natives, was sent to make an attack on the farmer 
mentioned". (34) The farmer, however, resisted so fiercely that the 
party eventually disbanded and dispersed. 
As in the case of Basutoland, and the Langeberg rebellion in 
the Cape, rinderpest had formed the backdrop of attempts by Africans to 
mobilize support for revolt against European Authority. (35) These 
events also hastened the establishment of a permanent Criminal 
Investigation Department in East Griqualand, earned Le Fleur a 15 year 
prison sentence, resulted in the dismissal of one headman in the Kokstad 
district, and caused a second to be fined £100. These circmstances did 
aothing to remove the tensions from the area. The Chief Magistrate for 
the district, writing his report on the events surrounding Le Fleur, a 
year later, was still in a position to state that: "... the prevailing 
opinion is that a general rising, to which Le Fleur's abortive attack 
was a prelude, is not far distant." (36) 
Before turning attention from these more overtly llpolitical 
responses" to rinderpest, two limitations of this account need to be 
stated. Firstly, besides the more dramatic activities already described, 
rinderpest, again indirectly, offered other, more marginal, opportunities 
for political expression. (37) Secondly, the political aspects have so 
far been portrayed in terms of llwhite-blackll c eavages and politics. 
This is only one dimension of the political effects of rinderpest. 
What is now needed is a detailed account of what occurred not between 
black and white communities, but within African political systems. 
We need to know the detailed infrastructure of what Saker and Aldridge 
term "dynastic politicsf1. Why did Lerothodi provide Makhaola with only I 
passive support? Why, in East Griqualand, were the Hlangweni, but not 
the Baca, willing to conspire with Le Fleur? Which Africans later 
supported Le Fleur,and what were their reasons? Until these aspects 
are systematically explored, we can have only a very crude idea of the 
political impact of rinderpest on African communities. This 
qualification is applicable to much of what follows, too. 
From the political, we turn to a consideration of some of the 
social responses which rinderpest evoked in Southern Africa. In 
communities where every facet of life had a racial dimension, it is 
perhaps to be expected that rinderpest should reveal, and often place in 
sharp relief, the state of race relations. 
It has been made clear that throughout central and southern 
Africa Africans believed that rinderpest was spread by whites. 
Similarly whites, some of them in official positions, believed that it 
was spread by Africans. (3%) Du Plessis, an official delegate from -the 
Transvaal to one of the rinderpest conferences, when asked to account for 
the spread of rinderpest into his couiitry, replied: 
opinion is that it is the Kaffirs. In the south 
they have had all their cattle destroyed by the 
pest and now they wish to do likewise by the cattle 
of the Boers, and so involve the whole country in 
ruin.I1 (39) 
In practice, this highly contagious disease was very frequently 
spread by white farmers, vho were mobile, active in Crade and apt to 
console their rinderpest-stricken neighbours with little regard for the 
risks of contagion this involved. (40) While the mistrust between black 
and white was mutual, the regulations to control the spread of the 
disease were applied with greater vigour to Africans. 
The authorities resorted to widespread use of disinfectants, 
which were used on all travellers. (41) Only Africans, however, were 
required to undergo complete dipping, a procedure explained by the 
Transvaal Veterinary Surgeon thus: 
"Every Kaffir from an infected area is dipped by 
us, and everything he wears is washed and the 
guards have strict orders to burn any milk, meat 
or cattle products found in his possession. 
After being washed he has to remain there until 
he is dry, when he gets a pass, and he may then 
go on his way." (42) 
The dipping procedure naturally did not meet with unqualified 
African approval, as even the Cape Veterinary Surgeon had noted. A 
certain class of Africans, as Hutcheon reported, objected to being 
dipped "like raw Kaffirs"; but he was careful to point out that If.. 
the ordinary policeman cannot be expected to exercise that fine 
discernment . . . It. (43) The enforcement of these regulations, coupled 
with the suspicions already present, must have strained race relations 
and it is not surprising that whites made observations such as "...the 
usual friendly politeness of the native was changed to an attitude of 
semi-contemptuous insolence". (44) 
As in all communities, the religious systems in the region 
operated to explain, to their respective adherents, the origin and 
purpose of the disaster. In the midst of the fight against rinderpest 
in Bechuanaland, the Cape Colonial officials did not work on 15th 
October, since that day was 'I. set apart for Humiliation and Prayer, 
and was solemnly recognised in Vryburg1'. (45) The Hereros in South West 
Africa, devastated by the loss of their cattle, were placed at the 
mercy of the missionaries. Out of convenience or conviction, they went 
to mission stations and there If.. were signs of a general movement 
towards conversion which the missionaries saw as a blessing concealed 
in the disaster". (46) Other areas also saw Africans moving to mission 
stations. (47) 
The traditional religious organizations also deserve closer 
scrutiny. Through the work of Terence W g e r  and others, we know of the 
religious mobilization in the 1896-97 Rhodesian revolt, but it would be 
interesting to know in greater detail how the ~debele/Shona religious 
authorities confronted the substantial losses of cattle inflicted by 
war and rinderpest. Saker and Aldridge do not report an increase in 
traditional religious activity during the Langeberg rebellion but 
elsewhere there are clear indications of attempts by the traditional 
system to explain rinderpest. 
Before the full impact of rinderpest made itself felt in the 
Transkei and Pondoland, the Chief Magistrate for the region reported a 
spate of wild rumours and prophecies: IIAmongst the la-tter there were 
stories of persons, animals, birds and even stones prophesying evils 
and wonderful things to come. l1 (48) The Magistrate, unfortunately, felt 
that these reports were "too wildf1 to warrent detailed investigation 
and documentation. The Mount Frere correspondent of the Cape Times, 
however, was able to recount some of these prophecies in greater detail, 
under the heading "Rinderpest and S~perstition~~: 
"There are mischief-makers in our midst who lose 
no opportunity for their own personal ends for 
spreading as much sedition as possible. The 
witchdoctors are busy, wonderful resurrection 
cases occurred recently ... A woman in the 
Umzimvubu died and rose again. During her 
brief sojourn in Heaven it was revealed to her 
that the white man had in his possession two 
boxes. The first contained rinderpest. This 
he had already opened. The second (to be unlocked 
shortly) contains locusts with horses teeth. 
These are destined for the destruction of the 
native root and branch. " (49) 
If it is remembered that after their cattle had died many 
Africans were forced to plant crops which were vulnerable to locusts, 
it can be appreciated how disturbing this type of prophecy must have 
been. (50) In the same district of Pondoland it was reported that 
Africans were refusing to purchase gcoceries,and in particular sugar 
and salt. (51) It seems probable that this self-imposed and 
religiously-sanctioned boycott served to protect Africans from some of 
the profiteering which occurred in parts (see below). 
Cattle farmers throughout Southern Africa, however, had too 
much at stake to rely solely on religious comforts or explanations. To 
white and black farmers alike it soon became apparent that the drastic 
"stamping outn policy was not staying the progress of rinderpest; Chief 
Molala in Bechuanaland probably spoke for most farmers when he pointedly 
asked Hutcheon: "They tell me that you are a doctor, and that you are 
a great doctor, but can you do nothing but kill?" (52) In the face of 
opposition to the "stamping out" policy, the Cape Government was forced 
to discontinue the practice. (53) "It is only natural, however", 
Hutcheon was to note later, "that men in distress will try something 
whether they have knowledge of its suitability or not, and a mysterious 
mixture has a charm which a known compound does not possess." (54) And 
whites from all walks of life were indeed offering "cures" for 
rinderpest. (55) Those 'publicised by officials, no more effective than 
any, eventually seriously jeopardized the success of the inoculation 
programme once a reasonably effective serum had been developed. (56) 
One such eminent creator of a homespun "cure" was to be the subject of 
complaints by Hutcheon in his official report: 
"His Honour the President of the South African 
Republic gave his high authority to the efficiency 
of a somewhat complex mixture, consisting mainly 
of podophyllin, resin, tobacco, paraffin oil, and 
a decoction of an incense plant. The result of 
the publication of this remedy, I am credibly 
infomed, was that the chemist's supply of 
podopwllin became exhausted. (57) 
Experiments such as these were not confined to whites, and 
Africans, too, attempted to cope medicinally with the scourge of 
rinderpest. 
In the Cape, the government, presumably with an eye on 
possible "native unrest", was anxious that Africans should be aware of 
the devastating nature of the disease. Before rinderpest reached them, 
Africans in the Cape and Basutoland were confident of their ability to 
deal with all sorts of cattle diseases. To prepare African opinion and 
to bring home to herbalists the magnitude of rinderpest, the Cape 
Government arranged for African representatives to visit Bechuanaland, 
see the devastation there, experiment with their own cures, and report 
back to specially convened meetings. (58) But this visit took place 
during the decline of rinderpest in Bechuanaland, and some of the 
visiting Africans left with the impression that their experiments there 
might have helped cure cattle. (59) It was only later, when rinderpest 
actually broke out amongst their own cattle, that Africans finally 
appreciated how devastating it was. Reflecting the desperation which 
they must have felt, they called the disease zifozonke - "every 
disease". (60) Elsewhere in the Cape, even more pointedly, the disease 
was called masilangane - "let us a11 be equal". (61) 
In the absence of an effective treatment and with the 
continuing advance of rinderpest, a fatalistic attitude developed 
amongst all sections of the population, leading the Eastern Province 
Herald to complain that: 
'!There are not wanting signs that there is in 
this colony a number of people who have made 
up their minds that the rinderpest must come, 
that no efforts to stop it will avail and 
that therefore there is really no use in 
worrying over the matter. There is, in fact, 
a disposition in some quarters to surrender 
without a blow. (62) 
Africans soon discovered that the meat left in the wake of 
rinderpest could be dried for biltong or eaten at once without ill 
effects. (63) Faced thus with an artificial surplus of meat, they 
engaged in "feasting" and protracted beer drinks. (64) 
After the failure of the early "stamping out" policy and the 
disbanding of the national Rinderpest Commission, the Cape Government 
persisted in their efforts to find a cure. (65) Besides encouragirig 
the work of Hutcheon and his assistants the government employed a 
German expert, Koch, who arrived in Cape Town on 1st December 1896. By 
the 5th December, Koch was already at work experimenting in a 
specially equipped laboratory in Kimberley, and receiving assistance 
from the De Beers! Company. (66) Eventually, Koch did succeed in 
producing a serum, but this by itself was no cause for optimism. Not 
only was the serum in short supply, but it produced erratic results, 
described as ". . . sometimes good, sometimes bad1'. (67) Because of the 
mixed results, the government did not make inoculation compulsory. (68) 
It later adopted another serum, developed by a Dr Edington, which was 
also in short supply. (69) The relative ineffectiveness, and 
unavailability, of s e m ,  and the unavoidable move of rinderpest south, 
until by late November it was active in Cape Town (70), make the growth 
and spread of fatalism amongst white and, even more so, black cattle 
owners understandable. 
The consequences of rinderpest, however, extended beyond 
"feasting", beer-drinking and fatalism. It would be somewhat myopic to 
agree with a Cape Inspector of Locations, who reported from one 
district that "The natives possessed some 4,500 head of cattle when 
rinderpest broke out here; they now have 467, but I cannot honestly 
report any great distress among them". (71) The number of cattle lost 
was the most obvious dimension with which to gauge the havoc mu&t 
throughout the country: 
"In the Transkei it was roughly estimated that 
90 per cent of the cattle, which formed the 
real wealth of the people, were swept off by 
the disease. For the Cape Colony as a whole 
(including Bechumland but excluding the 
native territories and r on do land) it was 
estimated that the cattle herds were reduced 
by 35 per cent from 1.64 to 1.06 million." (72) 
African cattle losses, however, should be measured not simply 
in terms of numbers. For African peasants, cattle formed not only a 
source of wealth but the pivotal point of a complex and inter-woven 
social, political and economic system. (73) Certainly cattle 
constituted "the real wealth of the people", but the devastation of 
rinderpest also brought economic repercussions which stretched beyond 
that dimension. 
With the transport system crippled by the loss of draught-oxen, 
prices soared. Transport drivers had to pay tremendous prices for 
"salted" cattle (i.e. animals that had recovered from the disease and 
were therefore immune), or mules. (74) !Their financial outlays were 
recouped from the transport charges they made, which rose, in parts to 
ten times the normal rate. (75) For those with the necessary capital, 
transport must have become a lucrative business. (76) These price 
increases were passed on to store owners, and finally to consumers. 
Amongst whites the situation was serious enough to warrant sharp 
editorial comment from the Cape Times: 
"The government, however, seems to be indulging 
in a vein of scientific curiosity, by gauging 
the exact amount of toleration of which an 
apathetic public is capable, but while the 
prices of milk and meat and every other article 
of food are rising at an alarming rate, the 
Government still preserves an unbroken eilence . (77) 
The necessary importation of meat from as far away as 
Madagascar meant prices in white urban centres increased. (78) But in 
isolated rural areas, where the bulk of the African population lived, 
there were also opportunities for profiteering. In Bechumland: 
"Owing to failure of transport, following on the 
outbreak of rinderpest, the cost of living in 
the Northern Protectorate was enormously 
increased, and the natives who have been 
spending money with reckless extravagance must 
hzve been greatly impoverished. In the midst 
of the times of greatest want the natives would 
eagerly flock to the local stores to secure meal 
at B10 per bag of 200 lbs., sugar at 2s. and 
2s.6d. per lb,, and sweets, jams and other 
luxuries at exorbitant rates. It is as though 
the natives, having been at last compelled to 
open their purses, could not rest until their 
savings had been expended. The local merchants 
have reaped a rich harvest, but the lavish 
expenditure by the natives of their cash must 
inevitably affect the trade of the district 
for some time to come." (79) 
With merchants in some areas increasing 'Ithe prices for 
foodstuffs out of all proportion to the increase in transport rates", 
it is apparent why Africans in some districts refused to buy salt or 
sugar through "s~perstition~~. (80) 
The shortage of salt or sugar, however, was not nearly as 
serious as the loss of meat and milk, once rinderpest had passed. The 
loss of their wealth and the rising prices must have put the purchase 
of meat or milk beyond the reach of most Africans. The European 
newspapers complained of the danger of meat becoming a llluxuryll in the 
urban areas. For rural cattle-keepers the danger was even greater, for 
they were without items that amounted to staple foods, and health 
suffered accordingly. In South-West Africa, the Hereros, left without 
milk, were particularly vulnerable when malaria swept through the area 
after rinderpest. (81) The high incidence of scurvy was noted in the 
Barkly West district. Perhaps mistakenly, the Inspector of Native 
Locations attributed this to a lack of meat to supplement a monotonous 
diet of porridge. (82) What is clear is that the health of African 
children, who no longer benefited from milk, suffered considerably in 
some areas. (83) 
These effects were not universal, but do partly reflect the 
impact of rinderpest, and the extent to which local resources were able 
to cope. Bechuavlaland was impoverished virtually overnight, and there 
were numerous cases of starvation. (84) As government relief depended 
on local magisterial initiative, the hardship experienced in different 
communities varied considerably. In many areas stock-theft was resorted 
to. In Idutywa, the Resident Magistrate reported,somewhat dramatically, 
an "epidemic of theft". (85) While Idutywa might not be typical, a 
large number of areas in the Cape did report an increase in stock 
thefts. (86) The nature of this stock-thieving is perhaps revealed, as 
is the desperation of certain individuals, in the following report from 
Bechuanaland: "Most of these were thefts of one or two animals (among 
them two native females for stealing and eating a young donkey), mostly 
due to hunger." (87) 
Faced with the loss of milk, meat, currency, wealth, food, 
fuel, fertilizer and animals to use for ploughing, Africans had to 
resort to hasty contingency planning until they had sufficient wealth to 
undertake restocking. The Herero were seen growing vegetables for the 
first time after rinderpest, and elsewhere, too, cattle-keepers had to 
grow crops. (88) Ploughing had to be done with anything that was 
available. In Basutoland they used their ponies. (89) In the Cape they 
used my animal available, or, in some cases, paid Europeans to plough 
for them. (90) 
That this was possible is indicative of the fact that in 
certain areas Africans held cash reserves. In some areas there was 
considerable surprise, in administrative circles, at the extent of 
these. (91) Despite rinderpest, hut tax was fully paid in some Cape 
districts. (92) Once the immediate problem of food production had been 
"solved", however, Africans were forced into the cash economy to obtain 
funds for restocking their herds. By 1898, the year after rinderpest 
had ended, Africans were already reinvesting in stock, despite the high 
ruling prices. (93) But for some in need of money, entry into the cash 
economy did not simply involve a casual migratory journey to earn funds 
for restocking; many were forced to make a more permanent adjustment, 
either by regular migratory journeys or a permanent move to the towns. (94) 
Africans forced into the migratory labour system through 
rinderpest and other socio-economic forces, however, exercised 
considerable care in their choice and location of employment. The 
Hereros worked at railway construction, rather than for white farmers. (95) 
In Bechmaland, too, the railway to Rhodesia was built, in part, by 
"rinderpest labour". (96) It was only with extreme reluctance that 
Africans from the Cape and elsewhere would proceed to the Transvaal 
goldfields. (97) The harshness of the conditions there was apparent to 
Africans and administrators alike; from the Cape it was reported that: 
"The large number of natives continually arriving at Indwe by rail on 
their return from the Transvaal in a destitute and infirm condition 
necessitated the establishment at that place of a Native Shelter, at 
which food and medical attendance has been provided." (98) Even in 
Bechuanaland, where the situation was desperate enough for women to go 
out and seek work and some of the villages presented "quite a deserted 
appearanceff, Africans were reluctant to go to the Transvaal. (99) 
Rinderpest undoubtedly provided an industrializing state with increased 
labour from people driven off the land by misfortune but even that, 
coupled with taxation and other restrictions, could not make supply 
meet demand. (100) a 
Masilangane - let us all be equal - no doubt applied in the 
tribal economy where the cattle of chief and peasant alike were 
attacked by rinderpest. "Dtama himself, who is said to have had three 
or four hundred head of trained trek oxen, did not have a sufficient 
number of them to make up one span." (101) But South Africa did not 
possess a traditional economy. Rather, it was an industrializing state 
with a doctrine of "labour economics that skill and high wages were a 
privilege of the white race, while the heavy labour and menial tasks 
were the province of the black racer9. (102) In a system which depended 
on cheap black labour, rinderpest was not an unmitigated disaster. It 
did not matter if Transkei Africans were "incorrect" in their belief 
that "the government had introduced the disease for the purpose of 
impoverishing the people and thus forcing them to go out and work at 
the mines". (103) While the disease was obviously not spread by the 
government, and mining companies like De Beers assisted in the fight 
against the disease, the loneterm results of rinderpest had beneficial 
aspects for both. It is prob&bly true that rinderpest might have eased 
land pressure for a few African farmers; it is certain to have 
contributed to the proletarianization of Africans. In a system with a 
complex and inter-woven pattern of class and colour, it was not long 
before officials were stating the "beneficial" results of rinderpest: 
"The ravages of rinderpest, although reducing the 
native to poverty, has not been without very 
beneficial results, and the native has now learnt 
humility to those to whom he is subordinate, 
and also the lesson that by work only can he 
live, and having learnt to work he is now a 
happy and contented man instead of the 
discontented, indolent, lazy and besotten 
being he was when the numerous cattle he 
possessed provided his every want. (104) 
Rinderpest did not produce my major structural changes in the emerging 
pattern of South African society; instead it revealed and often 
exaggerated those political, social and economic forces which were to 
play a central role in the industrialized South Africa of the 20th 
century. 
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